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Abstract—For the proper performance of Vehicular Ad-hoc
NETworks (VANETs) it is essential to protect the service against
malicious nodes aiming at disrupting the proper operation by
injecting fake, invalid data into the network. It is common to
define a traditional identity-based authentication for vehicles,
which are loaded with individual credentials. However, the use of
these credentials in VANETs may allow vehicle tracking and thus
violate users’ privacy, a risk that can be overcome by means of
anonymity schemes. This comes at the expenses, however, of on
the one hand preventing VANET authorities from identifying
malicious users and revoking them from the network, or on
the other hand to avoid anonymity of users in front of the
CA thus to allow their revocation. In this work, we describe a
novel revocation scheme that is able to track and revoke specific
users only after a number of complaints have been received while
otherwise guaranteeing vehicle’s anonymity.
Index Terms—VANET, revocation, k-anonymity
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there is a bunch of GPS-based applications
offering traffic services based on information provided by
local road authorities, police departments and systems that
track traffic flow. Some of these applications, such as Google
Traffic [7], TomTom [16], Sygic [15] or Waze [18], can
even provide near real-time data about traffic status and
congestions. However, for these services to properly work,
users should provide information with at least their location to
the companies offering these services without any guarantee
that these companies will use this data for other considerations
[1]. Therefore, users’ privacy may be at risk.
Conventional VANETs and current traffic applications do
not protect users’ privacy. They can breach the privacy of
the user of the vehicle because they manage information
that reveals the location of vehicles at every moment. Nodes
and/or users’ privacy may be violated by the Certification
Authority (CA) as long as it provides their certificates, but
also by companies managing traffic data or Traffic Authorities
(TAs), which can locate and track vehicles based on their
transmissions. Protecting users against tracking can be solved
by providing user anonymity but, at the same time, this lack of
tracking avoids the revocation of malicious/misbehaving nodes
disrupting the service operation.
In this work we propose a novel scheme that protects
users’ privacy in front of other users, TAs and even the CA
while also offering the possibility to track malicious user and
thus to throw them out of the system when a predefined
amount of complaints have been received. As later explained
malicious user can only be tracked after a predefined amount
of complaints are received by the CA. To do this we will
use k-anonymity protection that allow that the information for
nodes contained in the release cannot be distinguished from
at least k-1 individuals whose information also appears in the
release.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II covers related
research about privacy in VANETs. In Section III we present
the proposed method to guarantee anonymity of users while
allowing tracking malicious users. In section IV we derive an
analytical model to analyze the efficiency of the method. This
model has been validated via simulation in section V, where
we also provide the results obtained by means of the model
for a real scenario. Finally, the conclusions of this work are
presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
Sweeney proposed k-anonymity at first in 2002 [14] and
its original intention was to thwart the ability to link field-
structured databases, but has been viewed more broadly, and
have been applied to many other fields, such as VANET.
In [13], authors use k-anonymity in VANET applications
where k-anonymity is provided by a centralized anonymizer
based on the users’ real location. The author proposes a
homomorphism for the location of a group of users that are
near to others users. However, tracking with less precision is
already possible and users need to wait until at least k−1 other
users are close to their location to achieve enough anonymity.
This delay reduces the quality of the users localization in time
and space which compromises real-time service availability
and accuracy. Thus, this approach does not work in case of
real-time services and also in low density areas of users.
[19] proposes a hybrid and social-aware location-privacy in
Opportunistic mobile social networks (HSLPO), a collabora-
tive and distributed obfuscation protocol that offers location-
privacy k-anonymity.
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In [2] authors propose a self-managed VANET without
CA based on Certificates Graphs where every node has a
pseudonym and many sub-pseudonyms that change frequently
in a range of time, at this way, passive users cannot track other
users. In this scenario there is neither a RSU nor any cloud
connection. Therefore, tracking from the cloud is impossible.
The unique way to track another user is physically because
the user must be authenticated with another user to track it.
In [20] vehicles entering a group can anonymously broad-
cast vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) messages, this is another way to
preserve privacy but the TM has the ability to retrieve the real
identity of dishonest vehicles that are sending fake messages
to other vehicles to disrupt traffic, so the privacy is violated.
[4] present different privacy-preserving variants to ensure
that vehicles volunteering to generate and/or endorse trust-
worthy announcements do not have to sacrifice their privacy.
[11] proposes a protocol to exclude malicious network
nodes based on complaints received from other vehicles. [17]
presents another protocol that uses decentralized revocation
voting. [12], [8], [9] are other approaches for conditional
anonymity in VANET.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the proposals in the
literature provide both complete anonymity (even against the
CA providing the credentials) while allowing to later identify
an anonymous user in order to revoke him/her from the system.
In our proposal we achieve this goal only and only if several
complaints against a user is received.
III. A TRACEABLE K-ANONYMITY METHOD FOR VANETS
In this section, we propose a method that provides k-
anonymity [14] in VANETs while still guaranteeing that
malicious users will be traceable. The method operation is
as follows. Every user is randomly associated to a group
n with k members that share cryptographic material, i.e., a
pair of private-public keys (PKuGn , PKsGn), and a group
certificate Cert(Gn, t), which will be used to sign messages
and authenticate data. In order to reduce the computational
cost, we assume the use of cryptography based on elliptic
curves [3]. We also consider the existence of a CA, which is
responsible for creating the groups, maintaining a database
with the group membership, distributing the cryptographic
material among users and revoking users that misbehave.
When a user detects an undesired behavior from another
user, such as the injection of false data, it presents a complaint
to the CA. Such complaint is signed with its group key and
must report the group identifier of the malicious user. In its
turn, the CA flags all the users belonging to that group and
stores this information at its database. As users do not reveal
their particular identities but only their group identifier, both
the malicious user and the one sending the complaint cannot be
distinguished from other users belonging to the same group.
Thus, they cannot be tracked by the CA or by other users.
This feature protects users’ privacy, but it makes a hard task
to revoke and isolate malicious users from the network.
In order to achieve the traceability of malicious nodes
to revoke them, we propose the use of group certificates
with short-term expiration dates that henceforth we will call
roundr. When the group certificate of a user is about to
expire it must send a query to the CA to update it, which
will check if the user is revoked based on the number of
flags it has received. The rationale behind such mechanism is
that users will change of group over time and will be flagged
whenever they belong to the group reported in a complaint.
Due to the fact that you can not identify what node is having
a bad behaviour, only one complaint is valid in each round.
Assuming that malicious users repeatedly misbehave, they will
be flagged at least the same amount of times or more than any
other honest node in the network and thus they can be easily
revoked by the CA. Note that, a revoked user will be expelled
from the system once it has to update its certificate, as it will
not be able to acquire a new valid certificate.
The certificate updating process is a key point for the
VANET safety and operation. On the one hand, if the time
for updating the certificate t is short, it greatly increases
processing data on the server and number of server-users
communications. On the other hand, if this measure is too
long, malicious users would remain in the network for a longer
time without being revoked. As a first, trivial approach, given
that the average trip time by car is about 22 minutes each way
[5], the lifetime of a certificate t should be no more than 22∗2f ,
with f the number of complaints that the CA needs to revoke a
user if we want to remove malicious users from the system in a
single day. Furthermore, in order to reduce overhead, multiple
certificates can be issued without interaction between CA and
the user [10].
The level of anonymity provided by this method increases
as the group size k does. However, as previously mentioned, k-
anonymity complicate the process of revoking users. In section
IV we derive an analytical expression for the number of false
positives and false negatives, i.e., the number of honest users
being revoked and the number of malicious users that remain
in the network, provided by this method as a function of the
anonymity value k, the number of complaints needed to revoke
users and the number of group changes.
The CA should guarantee that the assignment of a user to
a given group is kept secret and exclusively known to the
user and itself, and that only the members of the group have
access to the group cryptographic material. Because of this,
every user should be provided with a public/private key pair
and the corresponding certificate when entering the network.
Such cryptographic material would be exclusively used for
communication with the CA in order to authenticate the user
against it and renew group certificates.
IV. ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section, we derive the probability of false positives
and false negatives of the proposed k-anonymity mechanism,
i.e., the probability of an honest user being regarded as
malicious one and the probability of not detecting and actual
attacker. For the sake of clarity, table I presents the specific
notation considered from now on.
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TABLE I
NOTATION
r number of rounds
n number of users in the system
a number of malicious users
p prob. of a malicious user performing an attack in a round r
k number of users in a group
f number of flags needed to revoke a user
t time of the certificate expiration
ph prob. of an honest user being flagged in a round
pa prob. of an attacker being flagged in a round
pf,rh prob. of a honest user being flagged f times after r rounds
pf,ra prob. of an attacker being flagged f times after r rounds
FP r.v. number of false positives in r rounds and f flags
FN r.v. number of false negatives in r rounds and f flags
Given these definitions, we denote as ph and pa the
probabilities of an honest user and an attacker, respectively,
receiving a flag in a given round r, and can be computed as
in (1) and (2) with αh = min(k−1, a) and αa = min(k−1, a−1).
ph =
=
αh∑
i=1
(
k−1
i
) i∏
j=1
a−j+1
n−j
k−i−1∏
j=1
n−a−j
n−i−j
(
1− (1− p)i)
=
αh∑
i=1
(
k−1
i
) a! (n−a−1)! (n−k)!
(a−i)! (n−1)! (n−a−k+i)!
(
1− (1− p)i)
(1)
pa = p · 1 + (1− p)·
αa∑
i=1
(
k−1
i
) i∏
j=1
a−j
n−j
k−i−1∏
j=1
n−a−j+1
n−i−j
(
1− (1− p)i) (2)
Then, we can compute the probability of an honest user and
a real attacker being regarded as attackers after r rounds as in
(3) and (4), respectively.
pf,rh =
r∑
i=f
(
r
i
)
pih(1− ph)r−i (3)
pf,ra =
r∑
i=f
(
r
i
)
pia(1− pa)r−i (4)
From the above equations, it can be easily derived the
probabilities of false positives and false negatives as a function
of the number of rounds r, i.e., the probability of a honest user
being flagged as an attacker and the probability of an attacker
being regarded as a honest user after r rounds.
The probability of false positive after r rounds prfp is the
probability of at least one honest user having more than f
flags, which is equal to 1 minus the probability of all honest
users having less than f flags, and can be expressed as in (5).
prfp = 1−
(
1− pf,rh
)(n−a)
(5)
Analogously, the probability of false negative prfn is the
probability of at least one attacker having less than f flags
after r rounds, which is equal to 1 minus the probability of
all attackers having f or more flags, and can be expressed as
in (6).
prfn = 1−
(
pf,ra
)a
(6)
In order to analyze with more precision the goodness of the
mechanism, it can be useful to estimate the expected number
of false positives and false negatives and their variance, as a
function of the number of flags f and the number of rounds
r. Let us define FPf,r and FNf,r as two discrete random
variables following a binomial distribution that account for
the values of false positives and false negatives respectively.
Then, we can define their respective probability mass functions
as in (7)), with expected values µ as in (8) and variance σ2
as in (9).
fFPf,r (i) = P(FPf,r = i)
=
(
n− a
i
)
· (pf,rh )i · (1− pf,rh )n−a−i
fFNf,r (i) = P(FNf,r = i)
=
(
a
i
)
· (1− pf,ra )i · (pf,ra )a−i
(7)
µFP = E[FPf,r] =
n−a∑
i=1
i · P(FPf,r = i)
µFN = E[FNf,r] =
a∑
i=1
i · P(FNf,r = i)
(8)
σ2FPf,r = V[FPf,r] =
n−a∑
i=1
(i− µFPf,r )2 · fFPf,r (i)
σ2FNf,r = V[FNf,r] =
a∑
i=1
(i− µFNf,r )2 · fFNf,r (i)
(9)
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we first validate in section V-A the analytical
model presented in section IV via simulation, and then in
section V-B we evaluate the goodness of our proposal when
applied to a real scenario such as the current Spain’s vehicle
fleet.
In order to make the simulation easier, we have assumed in
the following that an attacker always attacks in a round, that
is to say that the protocol operation properly detects all the
attackers and thus cannot lead to false negatives. However,
there are still chances of leading to false positives (honest
users flagged as attackers) and therefore the following analysis
mainly focuses on the mean and variance of false positives.
A. Validation of the analytical model
Figure 1 shows the mean number of false positives obtained
by simulation (100 iterations per each possible combination) in
dashed line vs the mean and standard deviation in continuous
line obtained by the analytical model. Due to space constraints,
we present just a specific case; the purpose of it is just to show
that the analytical model properly fits the protocol behavior.
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Fig. 1. False positives after 10 rounds with 1,000 nodes
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Fig. 2. Mean and STD of false positives vs k-anonymity after 12 rounds for
a varying number of attackers
Obviously, it also fits in any other case but in the figures we
present the average number of false positives after 10 rounds
of operation in a network with 1000 nodes, a varying number
of malicious nodes from 1 to 10 which are selected randomly
and values k of anonymity ranging from 10 to 100 nodes
per group also selected randomly. As per the figure, one can
clearly notice that simulation values are within the range of
expected values as per the analytical model.
Once showed the validity of the analytical model, in the
following we evaluate the goodness of our proposal applied to
the Spain’s vehicle fleet.
B. Application to the Spain’s car fleet
In this section we present the results obtained from the
analytical model for the Spain’s vehicle fleet in 2012[6], which
rises up to 31,203,203 vehicles.
Figure 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of false
positives obtained for a varying number of concurrent attackers
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Fig. 3. Mean and STD of false positives vs rounds with 20 concurrent
malicious nodes for a varying value of k-anonymity
ranging from 1 to 50 and k-anonymity from 10,000 to 150,000.
First impressions from the figure are that, as expected, the
performance of the protocol increases with the number of
nodes (now is 30,000 times greater than in section V-A).
This is because, for the same level of k-anonymity, the
number of groups increases, and therefore the probability of an
honest user coinciding in every group with a malicious node
diminishes.
Following the above reasoning and the results in the figure,
the protocol performance decreases with the value of k-
anonymity. That is to say that the more anonymity the worse
performance. However, the average number of false positives
is bounded to less than 1 (less than 3.205 · 10−6%) even for
pretty high values of k-anonymity, which may satisfy most of
the anonymity policies.
Figure 3 shows the evolution during time (rounds) of the
number of false positives (mean and standard deviation) for 20
concurrent attackers and k-anonymity ranging from 30,000 to
150,000. The conclusion here is clear: the average number of
false positives decreases in almost two orders of magnitude
in every single round; and this is very promising result.
Obviously, more rounds mean more time to detect attackers,
but just a few rounds make negligible the probability of
flagging an honest user as an attacker.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In a VANET, every vehicle must own valid credentials
issued by a trusted third party or CA in order to allow users
to authenticate data. However, the use of credentials linked to
vehicles may violate users’ privacy as long as it facilitates the
vehicle tracking. This is a risk that can be overcome by means
of anonymity schemes.
The use of anonymity schemes can mitigate the risk of
vehicles tracking; however, it comes at the expenses of: on
the one hand, preventing VANET authorities (CA and TAs)
from identifying malicious users and revoking them from the
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network; or on the other hand, to discard the anonymity of
users in front of the authorities thus to allow their revocation.
In this paper we have presented a method based on k-
anonymity that preserves the vehicles’ anonymity both against
other vehicles/users of the system and the authorities while still
being able to track malicious users and revoke them.
For the evaluation of the proposal, we have derived an
analytical model for the number of false positives and neg-
atives in several scenario conditions, and we have validated
the model by simulation. Then we have analyzed the perfor-
mance of our proposal with a real country vehicle fleet (the
Spanish one) leading to quite promising results in terms of
malicious tracking efficiency while providing good levels of k-
anonymity. Provided method can effectively identify malicious
users whenever they misbehave a given number of times with
almost negligible rates of false positives.
Other directions for future work include the development
and evaluation of possible attacks to the system, in parallel
with an investigation of more efficient and secure schemes.
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